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ASSOCIATED WITH THE ISOLATION AND 
DISCRIMINATION OF TRANSGENDER 
YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE  
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Abstract: The juvenile justice system is predicated on a theory of rehabilita-
tion with concern for protecting juveniles and society. For lesbian, gay, bisexu-
al, and transgender (“LGBT”) youth, however, the system has developed into a 
punitive arrangement. LGBT youth face higher rates of criminalization and 
incarceration for non-violent crimes than any other group of youth. They also 
face unique threats, including sexual, physical, and emotional harassment; iso-
lation; and a lack of medical care. Transgender youth are especially impacted. 
In response, victims have increasingly brought constitutional claims against 
federal prison officials for unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The 
courts are inconsistent on whether the judiciary should utilize the protections 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause or the Eighth Amendment’s 
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment to evaluate juvenile condi-
tions of confinement cases. This Note weighs the two approaches to determine 
that the due process clause is more protective of transgender and LGBT juve-
niles more broadly. 
INTRODUCTION 
As President Obama keenly noted, “We’ve got to make sure our juvenile 
justice system remembers that kids are different. Don’t just tag them as future 
criminals. Reach out to them as future citizens.”1 The juvenile justice system 
focuses on the needs of incarcerated juveniles because of an understanding that 
they are distinct from adults and should therefore be subject to different stand-
ards.2 President Obama recently prohibited prisons from placing juveniles in 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President at the 106th NAACP 
National Convention (July 14, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/14/
remarks-president-naacp-conference [https://perma.cc/PE2K-55TR] (discussing the necessity for 
reforms of the juvenile justice system to decrease incarceration and protect youth). 
 2 See Jody Marksamer, And by the Way, Do You Know He Thinks He’s a Girl? The Failures of 
Law, Policy, and Legal Representation for Transgender Youth in Juvenile Delinquency Courts, 5 
SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL’Y 72, 75 (2008) (discussing how law, policy, and legal representation 
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solitary confinement, based on recommendations by the U.S. Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”) that describe the psychologically damaging effects of this 
practice, particularly on juvenile prisoners.3 
Despite the purportedly greater protection for incarcerated youth in the 
justice system, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”) youth, espe-
cially transgender youth, are more likely to be incarcerated and face numerous 
abuses in confinement, due to the stigmatization of their gender identities 
and/or sexual orientation.4 In one of many common stories, Destiny, a trans-
gender girl with no record of a violent crime, was placed in T-Max, a boys’ 
juvenile detention center, normally meant for those with a prolonged history of 
violence.5 Due to her gender expression, while in this facility, Destiny faced 
sexual assault and the threat of violence from other inmates, and endured har-
assment and emotional abuse from staff.6 Additionally, facility staff punished 
Destiny for her gender expression, claiming that her everyday various behav-
iors, such as her walk and her manner of dress, were sexual.7 Destiny’s file 
                                                                                                                           
have regularly failed transgender youth in juvenile delinquency systems in the United States); Obama, 
supra note 1 (same). 
 3 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE USE OF RE-
STRICTIVE HOUSING 1, 101, 114 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/815551/download [https://
perma.cc/2G9A-Q72K] (discussing the problems associated with the use of solitary confinement in U.S. 
prisons); Barack Obama, Opinion, Barack Obama: Why We Must Rethink Solitary Confinement, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 25, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/barack-obama-why-we-must-rethink-
solitary-confinement/2016/01/25/29a361f2-c384-11e5-8965-0607e0e265ce_story.html?tid=a_inl 
[https://perma.cc/MXK5-YPUB] (discussing the need for punishment to correspond to the crime, 
which solitary confinement does not for juveniles). 
 4 See KATAYOON MAJD ET AL., HIDDEN INJUSTICE: LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANS-
GENDER YOUTH IN JUVENILE COURTS 1, 51–52, 61, 104–06 (2009) (examining the circumstances 
facing lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”) youth in juvenile courts across the country). 
The Equity Project, a coalition of advocacy groups, demonstrated how the juvenile justice system 
discriminates against LGBT youth in the form of intolerable living conditions, isolation, and abuse. 
Id. at 104–06. A 2010 survey illustrated that LGBT youth have experienced abuse, homelessness, and 
other strife at a rate twice their peers. See Angela Irvine, We’ve Had Three of Them: Addressing the 
Invisibility of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Gender Non-Conforming Youths in the Juvenile Justice 
System, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 675, 689 (2010) (describing a national survey of the juvenile 
justice system to bring attention to incarceration of LGBT youth at disproportionate rates and the 
inhumane treatment they face while confined). The findings also showed that LGBT youth are more 
likely to be detained for minor crimes and continually abused and ostracized, resulting in a cycle of 
incarceration. See id. 
 5 See Marksamer, supra note 2, at 77, 79 (describing how Destiny was sent to T-Max, not because 
she was violent, but because other facilities refused to take her on the basis of her transgender identi-
ty). 
 6 Id. at 77. In one instance, a fellow inmate grabbed Destiny, pushed her onto the bed, got on top 
of her, and rubbed his erect penis against her backside as he made lewd remarks. Id. at 82. 
 7 Id. at 82. For example, staff members tried to force Destiny to behave in a manner more com-
monly associated with boys. Id. This included banning her from crossing her legs or clicking her 
tongue in what was deemed a feminine manner. Id. Preventing someone from expressing their gender 
identity can create stress and anger, undermining an incarcerated youth’s rehabilitation. Id. 
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contained many violations related to Destiny’s gender expression, including 
violations related to her manner of dress and dance.8 
In a series of interviews by the Equity Project, a coalition between Legal 
Services for Children, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, and the National 
Juvenile Defender Center, it was found that many officials in the juvenile jus-
tice system believe that LGBT youth have mental health issues or are sexually 
aggressive toward others.9 The interviews showed that LGBT youth are sex-
ually objectified more than their peers.10 This hyper-sexualization of LGBT 
youth results in increased prosecution for consensual sex in comparison to 
their non-LGBT peers.11 This leads to the classification of many LGBT youth 
as sex offenders merely because of their gender identity or sexual orientation.12 
As a result of this classification, LGBT youth are often placed with legitimate 
sexual offenders, increasing their chances of sexual assault.13 
In addition to sexual offender classifications, transgender youth specifi-
cally are often housed according to their birth sex in order to make them fit 
within the general population, which is inapposite to their gender expression.14 
Along with taking an emotion toll, this creates the opportunity for more sexual 
and physical abuse.15 Unfortunately, reports show many instances of facility 
staff instigating fights and abuse between youth and consciously allowing inju-
ry to LGBT youth.16 
                                                                                                                           
 8 Id. 
 9 MAJD ET AL., supra note 4, at v, 52, 104. These perceptions lead to discrimination, including 
isolation or shaming under the guise of protecting other youths. Id. at 104–07. 
 10 Id. at 104. 
 11 See JEROME HUNT & AISHA MOODIE-MILLS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE UNFAIR CRIMI-
NALIZATION OF GAY AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH: AN OVERVIEW OF THE EXPERIENCES OF LGBT 
YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 5 (2012) (reviewing the experiences of LGBT youth in the 
juvenile justice system). This hyper-sexualization of gay and transgender youth results in overly re-
strictive confinement, conveying the message to LGBT youth that their sexuality and gender expres-
sion is wrong, and exposing them to further abuse. Id. at 5–6. 
 12 Laura Garnette et al., Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) Youth and the Juvenile 
Justice System, in JUVENILE JUSTICE: ADVANCING RESEARCH, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 156, 167 
(Francine T. Sherman & Francine H. Jacobs eds., 2011) (discussing how many LGBT youth experi-
ence social stigma and abuse from their families and peers, resulting in negative outcomes, including 
involvement in the juvenile justice system, where they face even more abuse). 
 13 See Rudy Estrada & Jody Marksamer, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Young People 
in State Custody: Making the Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice Systems Safe for All Youth Through 
Litigation, Advocacy, and Education, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 415, 428–29 (2006) (arguing that officials 
within the child welfare and justice systems react differently to LGBT youth than other youth, includ-
ing limiting their access to services and allowing them to face violence and harassment); Sarah Valen-
tine, Traditional Advocacy for Nontraditional Youth: Rethinking Best Interest for the Queer Child, 
2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1053, 1094–95 (discussing why attorneys representing children who are per-
ceived by others to be a sexual minority must zealously advocate on behalf of their clients because of 
the severe levels of danger facing the children). 
 14 HUNT & MOODIE-MILLS, supra note 11, at 6. 
 15 Id. 
 16 MAJD ET AL., supra note 4, at 103. 
354 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:351 
To add to these practices, some facilities will put transgender youth in sol-
itary confinement or isolate them without any reason, purportedly for their 
own safety, which further stigmatizes them.17 Other times, this isolation is jus-
tified for the safety of others, predicated on the mistaken assumption that 
LGBT youth are sexual predators.18 Most often, placement in isolation is based 
purely on a LGBT youth’s gender expression and/or sexual orientation.19 The 
American Psychiatric Association (“APA”) has stated that isolation is punitive 
and may have a lasting, negative emotional impact on transgender youth.20 
Isolation can stop youth from experiencing everyday activities including recre-
ation and socialization, which is extremely important in this stage of their 
lives.21 Courts have reiterated the punitive nature of the isolation or segrega-
tion of youth for long periods of time thus making it impermissible for such 
youth to be placed in isolation; a position reinforced by President Obama and 
the DOJ.22 
Access to adequate health care is another issue specifically facing 
transgender youth.23 Courts have found that the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tects all juvenile detainees by ensuring that they have access to adequate health 
care as a basic condition of confinement, though the contours of this right are 
unclear.24 This affirmative right to safety imposes a corresponding duty on the 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See HUNT & MOODIE-MILLS, supra note 11, at 6 (discussing the stigmatization of LGBT youth 
in the juvenile justice system). Protecting the safety of LGBT youth is a valid concern considering the 
abuse they face. See MAJD ET AL., supra note 4, at 106 (discussing the numerous abuses facing LGBT 
youth in prison). Instead of isolating LGBT youth, there are much fairer safeguards, including better 
staffing, better management, and various programming. Id. at 106–07. 
 18 See SHANNON WILBER ET AL., SERVING LGBT YOUTH IN OUT-OF-HOME CARE: CWLA BEST 
PRACTICE GUIDELINES 7 (Julie Gwin ed., 2006), available at http://www.nclrights.org/legal-help-
resources/resource/child-welfare-league-of-america-cwla-best-practice-guidelines-serving-lgbt-youth-
in-out-of-home-care/ [https://perma.cc/79NC-24QX] (providing a policy and practice guide for work-
ing effectively with LGBT youth in child welfare and juvenile settings). 
 19 MAJD ET AL., supra note 4, at 107; Estrada & Marksamer, supra note 13, at 428. 
 20 HUNT & MOODIE-MILLS, supra note 11, at 6. 
 21 Id.; Marksamer, supra note 2, at 74. LGBT youth reported to the Equity Project that isolation 
alienated them and made them feel that “it’s not okay to be gay.” MAJD ET AL., supra note 4, at 107. 
 22 See R.G. v. Koller, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1148 (D. Haw. 2006) (asking defendants to stop the 
discriminatory, abusive behavior, including isolation, against LGBT or LGBT perceived youth); U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 101, 114 (discussing the problems associate with solitary confine-
ment); Obama, supra note 3 (condemning solitary confinement for juveniles). Expert evidence sup-
ported the conclusion that such isolation was not allowed as a rehabilitative practice in the juvenile 
justice system. See R.G., 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1148–49. 
 23 MAJD ET AL., supra note 4, at 112. 
 24 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 
572, 584 (3d Cir. 2004) (assessing the facility’s treatment of the prisoner’s medical needs under the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Alexander S. v. Boyd (Alexander S. I), 876 F. Supp. 773, 788 (D.S.C. 1995) 
(recognizing minimal health care as a traditional due process interest of conditions of confinement 
claims). 
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state to provide protection from both mental and physical harm.25 Advocates 
have reported stories where their clients were forced to undergo conversion 
therapy in order to change their gender expression or sexuality.26 Furthermore, 
when transgender youth request medical intervention in order to transition to 
match their biological sex through hormone therapy, they are often denied 
care.27 Such treatments are necessary for some youth to fully acclimate and 
achieve comfort with their gender identity, which would support their mental 
and emotional health.28 
This Note analyzes conditions of confinement claims for incarcerated 
LGBT youth, with a focus on transgender youth, to determine whether such 
cases should be analyzed through the lens of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibi-
tion on cruel and unusual punishment or through the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
due process clause.29 Part I of this Note describes the substantive due process 
framework for conditions of confinement claims for pre-trial adult detainees, 
and the Eighth Amendment framework for post-conviction adult detainees.30 
Part II discusses the development of the due process right for incarcerated ju-
veniles in light of the specialized need to protect them while in custody.31 Part 
III explains how and why courts differ on whether to apply the due process 
                                                                                                                           
 25 Alexander S. I, 876 F. Supp. at 797–98. Protection from harm thus implicitly includes protec-
tion from the violence and harassment of other inmates and officials. Id. at 798. 
 26 See HUNT & MOODIE-MILLS, supra note 11, at 7 (describing social worker or court mandated 
conversion therapy, which have been determined to be unsafe); MAJD ET AL., supra note 4, at 64 (de-
scribing this practice of “reparative therapy,” which has been condemned by every major U.S. health 
organization); Valentine, supra note 13, at 1058 n.21 (describing facilities where reparative therapy 
includes physical and behavioral modification techniques). 
 27 See De’Lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 523 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that the plaintiff plausibly 
plead that the denial of sex reassignment surgery for a gender identity disorder was deliberate indif-
ference to a serious medical need and violated her Eighth Amendment rights); see also CATHERINE 
HANSSENS ET AL., A ROADMAP FOR CHANGE: FEDERAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDRESS-
ING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF LGBT PEOPLE AND PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV 20 (2014) (discussing 
the denial of transition health care, which is often necessary for the medical health of inmates); AISHA 
C. MOODIE-MILLS & CHRISTINA GILBERT, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, RESTORING JUSTICE: A BLUE-
PRINT FOR ENSURING FAIRNESS, SAFETY, AND SUPPORTIVE TREATMENT OF LGBT YOUTH IN THE 
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 10 (2014) (arguing why adequate medical care, including transition relat-
ed care, is necessary for transgender youth). 
 28 MAJD ET AL., supra note 4, at 50–51; MOODIE-MILLS & GILBERT, supra note 27, at 10. Some 
federal courts have determined the necessity of transition-related health care for transgender individu-
als, but it has not yet been mandated treatment provided by prisons. De’Lonta, 708 F.3d at 525; 
HANSSENS ET AL., supra note 27, at 20; MOODIE-MILLS & GILBERT, supra note 27, at 10. Both the 
American Medical Association and the American Psychological Association (“APA”) have publicly 
recognized the necessity for transition-related medical care and have called for improved access to 
these treatments. MOODIE-MILLS & GILBERT, supra note 27, at 10. Appropriate medical care gives 
transgender youth greater hope and respect for the system. Id. 
 29 See infra notes 130–186 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 34–57 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 58–75 and accompanying text. 
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clause or the Eighth Amendment to juvenile conditions of confinement cases.32 
Part IV evaluates why the due process clause is the necessary and reasonable 
standard to provide protection to incarcerated transgender juveniles through 
the judicial system as to the systemic conditions they face.33 
I. THE ADULT JUSTICE SYSTEM AND CONDITIONS OF  
CONFINEMENT CLAIMS 
The adult justice system is fundamentally different from the juvenile jus-
tice system and calls for distinct standards of judicial review based on detainee 
status for conditions of confinement claims.34 Section A of this Part describes 
the substantive due process requirements for conditions of confinement claims 
for pre-trial adult detainees.35 In contrast, Section B explains the Eighth 
Amendment requirements for conditions of confinement claims for convicted 
adult detainees.36 
A. Pre-Trial Detainees Receive Substantive Due Process Protection 
The Fourteenth Amendments provides citizens protection from state in-
trusions into “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”37 The U.S. 
Supreme Court has recognized that due process has a substantive element, 
providing a remedy against governmental violations of rights even when those 
rights are not explicitly enumerated in the text of the Constitution.38 In 1979, 
in Bell v. Wolfish, the Court established an objective standard by which pre-
trial detainees’ conditions of confinement could be evaluated to prevent abuse 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See infra notes 76–129 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 130–186 and accompanying text. 
 34 Compare Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (holding that a case involving prison 
inmates should be analyzed under the Eighth Amendment), with R.G., 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1152 (hold-
ing that juveniles adjudicated delinquent have not been convicted and their conditions of confinement 
claims should be evaluated under the due process clause). 
 35 See infra notes 37–44 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 45–57 and accompanying text. 
 37 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 38 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1992) (recognizing 
that the due process clause provides implicit substantive protections from intrusions on a citizen’s 
liberty by the state); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (recognizing the right of privacy as 
implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (holding “that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed 
by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance”). But see Daniels v. 
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 337 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (recognizing a substantive due process 
right but holding that prisoners did not have sufficient deprivation of their liberty by negligent state 
officials to amount to a violation of this right because substantive due process was traditionally ap-
plied to deliberate deprivations by government actors). 
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against incarcerated individuals.39 The Court held that substantive due process 
protects pretrial adult detainees from conditions of confinement that objective-
ly amount to punishment.40 
Two factors must be present for conditions of confinement to be classified 
as punitive.41 First, the detainee must establish they were subjected to a disa-
bility or a restrictive condition that harmed them beyond merely interfering 
with their comfort.42 Second, a court must determine whether the condition 
imposed is an incident of some legitimate governmental purpose or whether it 
is imposed for the purpose of punishment.43 As long as the condition applied to 
pre-trial detainees passes rational basis scrutiny, it does not amount to a sub-
stantive due process violation because it is not a punishment.44 
B. Post-Conviction Detainees Receive Cruel and Unusual  
Punishment Protection 
On the other hand, the protections offered to post-conviction adult prison-
ers regarding conditions of confinement claims are very different.45 The Eighth 
Amendment states that not just any punishments can be cruel and unusual.46 
The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause broadly beyond severe physical-
ly-damaging punishments to those that include the creation of unnecessary 
levels of pain or are disproportionate to the crime upon which the conviction 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–36 (1979) (holding that the confinement of two inmates 
in individual rooms and other conditions in a federal short-term custodial facility did not deny the 
inmates due process); David C. Gorlin, Note, Evaluating Punishment in Purgatory: The Need to Sepa-
rate Pretrial Detainees’ Conditions of Confinement Claims from Inadequate Eighth Amendment Anal-
ysis, 108 MICH. L. REV. 417, 423 (2009) (arguing that Eighth Amendment standards do not adequately 
address pretrial detainees’ substantive due process rights). 
 40 Bell, 441 U.S. at 535. 
 41 Id. at 538 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 539. In part this turns on whether there is an alternative government purpose to which the 
condition may be rationally related and whether the condition is excessive in comparison to that pur-
pose. See id. at 537–38 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963) (holding 
that statutes divesting an American of his citizenship for leaving or remaining outside of the United 
States at a time of war and national emergency to evade military service, are unconstitutional)). 
 44 Id. at 539. For example, a prison may have a legitimate interest in maintaining security from 
the outside. Id. To determine if the condition of confinement rises beyond a reasonable condition to 
the level of punishment, courts weigh a variety of subjective and objective factors, including the level 
of restraint, the past punitive nature of the condition, the necessity of scienter, if it is meant to fulfill 
the goals of punishment, whether it involves a criminal act, and how closely related it is to another 
objective. Kennedy, 372 U.S at 168–69. 
 45 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (holding that prison officials may be liable 
under the Eighth Amendment if there was a serious risk of harm that officials ignored by placing a 
transsexual prisoner in the general population). 
 46 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
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rests.47 Conditions of confinement amount to cruel and unusual punishment 
when imprisoned persons are not even given basic life necessities.48 As socie-
ty’s decency norms evolve, the limitations of this provision become more flu-
id.49 In 1994, in Farmer v. Brennan, the U.S Supreme Court held that a subjec-
tive test must be used to hold a prison official liable under an Eighth Amend-
ment claim for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement.50 The 
first prong of the test to establish a violation under the Eighth Amendment is 
whether there is serious harm caused by the restrictions of prison officials.51 
Second, prisoners must establish that prison officials exhibited subjective “de-
liberate indifference” to their basic needs.52 This test requires a more particu-
larized, fact-specific inquiry, requiring greater evidence of intent to harm than 
the test used in substantive due process claims.53 
Some federal circuits have concluded that either the due process clause or 
Eight Amendment standards can be utilized by the courts in conditions of con-
finement claims, resulting in similar protections for pretrial detainees and con-
                                                                                                                           
 47 Compare Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding that the death sentence for rape 
was cruel and unusual punishment because it was disproportionate to the crime), with Rhodes v. 
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (holding that placing two prisoners in one cell was not cruel and 
unusual punishment because it does not create undue pain and is not disproportionate to the crime), 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (holding that a death sentence for the crime of murder 
was constitutionally permissible because it is proportionate to the crime), and Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 
U.S. 130, 134–35 (1879) (holding that capital punishment through shooting is not cruel and unusual 
punishment because it does not create unnecessary pain). 
 48 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 355–56. 
 49 Id. at 346; James Alec Gelin, Unwarranted Punishment: Why the Practice of Isolating 
Transgender Youth in Juvenile Detention Facilities Violates the Eighth Amendment, 18 U.C. DAVIS J. 
JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 33 (2014) (describing how society’s standards of decency change over time). 
 50 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (holding that prison officials may be liable under the Eighth Amend-
ment for conditions of confinement only if they knew about a serious harm risk and deliberately ig-
nored this risk). 
 51 Id. at 834. 
 52 Id. In 1976, in Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court held that convicted inmates had to prove 
that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to their serious medical needs to state an Eighth 
Amendment claim. 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976) (holding that, although deliberate indifference to a 
prisoner’s serious illness or injury constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, the plaintiff’s complaint 
was insufficient to state a cause of action). The deliberate indifference requirement was then extended 
to Eighth Amendment claims alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement. See Wilson v. 
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991) (holding that prisoners claiming that conditions of confinement con-
stituted cruel and unusual punishment were required to show deliberate indifference on the part of 
prison officials). Therefore, a prison official can be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for the 
denial of humane conditions of confinement only if the official knows of and disregards an excessive 
risk to inmate health or safety, forming the requisite intent. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 
 53 Compare Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (holding that a prison official can only violate the Eighth 
Amendment for conditions of confinement by actually knowing and ignoring a risk of serious harm), 
with Bell, 441 U.S. at 535, 538 (holding that a restriction violates the due process clause if it is not 
“reasonably related to a legitimate non-punitive governmental purpose”). 
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victed prisoners under both standards.54 Contrary to this conclusion, there is a 
clear break in the standard established in Farmer (setting the standard for 
Eighth Amendment protection) as opposed to Bell (setting the standard for 
substantive due process protection).55 Requiring pre-trial detainees to establish 
deliberate indifference by prison officials for an Eighth Amendment claim re-
quires an inquiry into officials’ intent, unlike the objective standard under sub-
stantive due process, which requires only a determination as to whether the 
conditions themselves are punitive.56 Therefore, an Eighth Amendment claim 
requires a plaintiff to have knowledge as to what the official’s intention was at 
the time of the restriction, rather than a substantive due process claim, in which 
the court only looks at the objective effects of the condition to make a judg-
ment about whether the conditions amounted to punishment.57 
II. THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS ESTABLISHED FOR  
INCARCERATED JUVENILES 
In contrast to the adult criminal justice system, the juvenile justice system 
was initially established based on the presumption that children deserve more 
care and protection than adults because of the philosophical purposes underly-
ing each system.58 The socially reformative philosophy of the juvenile court 
focuses on the issues facing children and broader society and then provides 
protection and rehabilitation for both parties.59 It does not seek to fix criminal 
responsibility or provide punishment.60 U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence has 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See, e.g., Suprenant v. Rivas, 424 F.3d 5, 18 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that the limitations of 
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests are equal to those of the Eighth Amendment); Marsh v. Butler 
County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1024 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that the 11th Circuit has previously stated 
that the standards for providing for the conditions of incarcerated people is the same under the Four-
teenth and Eighth Amendments); Gorlin, supra note 39, at 426–27 (describing courts who use these 
standards “interchangeably,” applying Bell’s “amounts to punishment language,” along with the 
Eighth Amendment’s definition of punishment to pre-trial detainees’ claims). 
 55 See Gorlin, supra note 39, at 431 (describing the two different standards). 
 56 See id. 
 57 Compare Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (establishing the subjective Eighth Amendment test), with 
Bell, 441 U.S. at 535, 538 (establishing the objective, substantive due process test). 
 58 Marksamer, supra note 2, at 75; Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Devel-
opment and the Regulation of Youth Crime, 18 JUV. JUST. 15, 16, 19 (2008) (arguing for a newer “de-
velopmental model” in reforming the juvenile justice system). When youth crime rates rose and were 
attributed to the failure of the rehabilitative model, more punitive policies developed, holding youth 
responsible and punishing them for their crimes. Scott & Steinberg, supra, at 16, 19. Because of these 
reforms, youth were regularly transferred into the adult system. Id. at 16. Scholars argue for the devel-
opmental model to allow for juveniles to be subject to a lower standard of punishment than adults 
while still remaining accountable for crimes. Id. 
 59 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966) (holding that the juvenile defendant was enti-
tled to certain statutory procedural protections uniquely offered by the juvenile court because of his 
status as a juvenile). 
 60 Id. This is different from the traditional purpose of the adult criminal justice system, which is 
designed to punish individuals for their crimes to a proportionate degree—retribution for their crimes. 
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developed a line of cases around concerns for adolescent development and the 
limited culpability during this time in a juvenile’s life.61 The Court has limited 
the extent of punishment against juveniles because of this unique concern.62 
Section A of this Part describes the history of the juvenile justice system before 
juveniles had an established due process right.63 Section B describes the devel-
opment of due process rights for juveniles.64 
A. Juvenile Justice Before Juvenile Due Process Rights 
In the history of juvenile justice, the focus on the guidance and rehabilita-
tion of the child was achieved because the state was parens patriae and the 
system was not adversarial.65 The right of the state, as parens patriae, to deny 
                                                                                                                           
See Megan F. Chaney, Keeping the Promise of Gault: Requiring Post-Adjudicatory Juvenile Defend-
ers, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 351, 352 (2012) (comparing the goals of the adult justice 
system with those of the juvenile justice system to illustrate why the role of the post-adjudicatory 
lawyer would help the juvenile court be accountable to its original purposes). 
 61 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463–64 (2012) (holding that the sentencing of two 
juvenile offenders to mandated life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was unreasonable 
because it did not consider the lesser degree of culpability and opportunity for change inherent to 
juveniles); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010) (overturning the trial court sentencing of the 
defendant to life in prison without parole for a juvenile because it conflates with the purpose of reha-
bilitation, which juveniles need the most); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572–73, 578–79 (2005) 
(setting aside the death sentence of a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder because of the lack of 
culpability of juveniles). This Note will refer to Miller, Graham, and Roper collectively as the “ado-
lescent development cases.” 
 62 See Marksamer, supra note 2, at 75 (describing the difference between the juvenile and adult 
justice system described in Kent v. United States). In 2005, in Roper v. Simmons, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the Eighth Amendment bans the execution of individuals under eighteen years of age 
because capital punishment must be limited to the worst offenders with such high degrees of culpabil-
ity as to warrant execution. 543 U.S. at 568, 578–79. Unlike these worst offenders, the Court held that 
juveniles were not as mature as adults, lacked responsibility, were more easily pressured, and were 
still developing their personalities and characters. Id. at 568–70. Because of these differences, juve-
niles’ conduct do not rise to the level of blameworthiness as the conduct of an adult. Id. 
 63 See infra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. 
 64 See infra notes 69–75 and accompanying text. 
 65 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) (discussing the petition for writ of habeas corpus to 
secure release of a 15-year-old who had been committed as juvenile delinquent to a state industrial 
school). Parens patriae refers to the state as a sovereign in its “[c]apacity as a provider of protection 
to those unable to care for themselves.” Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
Undermining the purpose of a distinction for the juvenile justice system, prosecutors may effectuate 
the transfer of juvenile offenders to the adult court through waivers when a crime is particularly hei-
nous. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 552–53 (holding that although prosecutors have discretion in waiver de-
terminations, it still requires procedural process to satisfy basic fairness, statutory, and due process 
rules); Sally T. Green, Prosecutorial Waiver into Adult Criminal Court: A Conflict of Interests Viola-
tion Amounting to the States’ Legislative Abrogation of Juveniles’ Due Process Rights, 110 PENN ST. 
L. REV. 233, 244 (2005) (discussing the need to carefully consider any state scheme that contradicts 
itself by promoting the protection of juveniles by the state and then turns around and tries a juvenile as 
an adult). The prosecutorial waiver is in conflict with the role of the prosecutor as parens patriae for 
the state and requires the prosecutor to fight against the best interests of the juvenile. See Green, su-
pra, at 245 (same). This conflict is inherently unconstitutional because it is a conflict of interest in 
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children procedural rights available to adults was justified because a child, un-
like an adult, had a right to custody, not to the liberties afforded under the due 
process clause.66 If a child was delinquent, the state could intervene without 
depriving the child of his or her due process rights by merely providing the 
custody to which the child was entitled.67 At this point, no due process right 
existed for juveniles.68 
B. Juvenile Due Process Rights Developed 
In 1967, in In re Gault, the U.S. Supreme Court held that by denying ju-
veniles due process requirements, they received unequal treatment and reme-
dies compared to adults.69 The Court compelled the state to provide and im-
prove provisions for court action relating to juvenile confinement that were 
consistent with the due process clause, thereby creating a due process right for 
juveniles.70 As a result of In re Gault, all restrictions of liberty within juvenile 
justice facilities were made subject to the substantive due process standard, 
requiring all measures be “reasonably related” to a legitimate state interest to 
be constitutional.71 
The due process clause guarantees incarcerated juveniles the right to rea-
sonably safe conditions of confinement, “freedom from unreasonable bodily 
                                                                                                                           
violation of the defendant’s due process rights. Id. at 253–54. This harkens back again to the role of 
the state to protect the child, not punish the child. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 551–52 (ensuring that juve-
niles were provided certain constitutional rights because it would not make sense to give them less 
protection than to adults engaging in criminal activity). Moreover, the Court in In re Gault also read in 
a due process protection for juveniles in order to ensure that the state remains in the role of the child’s 
advocate and protects the child’s interest in conjunction with the doctrine of parens patriae. In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. at 25–26. 
 66 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 17 (granting the rights of “life, 
liberty and property” that cannot be taken away without “due process of law”); see also Curtis C. 
Shears, Legal Problems Peculiar to Children’s Courts, 48 A.B.A. J. 719, 720 (1962) (discussing the 
right of children to custody by the state when her parents cannot provide it, as opposed to liberty 
rights). 
 67 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 17. The Court established that a delinquent child was one whose 
parents had not sufficiently performed their parental duties, requiring state intervention and custody 
for the child. Id. Thus, adjudications with these children were civil. Id. 
 68 See id. 
 69 See id. at 19–20. 
 70 See id. at 25. In fact, citing a past sociological study, the Court observed that juveniles may feel 
resentment when they are not provided with due process rights and may respond negatively to at-
tempts at rehabilitation. Id. at 26 (citing STANTON WHEELER & LEONARD S. COTTRELL, JUVENILE 
DELINQUENCY: ITS PREVENTION AND CONTROL 33 (1966) (analyzing the history of juvenile justice 
and delinquency prevention)). 
 71 See Alexander S. v. Boyd (Alexander S. I), 876 F. Supp. 773, 798 (D.S.C. 1995) (holding that 
the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, not the Eighth Amendment, governed action brought 
by incarcerated juveniles challenging conditions of confinement). 
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restraint,” and adequate training of prison officials to protect those interests.72 
The interest in “freedom from unreasonable bodily restraint” includes a re-
quirement that a juvenile’s freedom can only be limited when there is a safety 
need that is reasonable under the circumstances.73 Consequently, juvenile jus-
tice facilities have a legal obligation to protect the juveniles in their care from 
harm.74 The facility administrators must make sure that there is an appropriate 
procedure in place in response to abuse to prevent further harm.75 
III. CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT CLAIMS AT JUVENILE DETENTION 
FACILITIES: JURISDICTIONAL DIFFERENCES 
Courts differ on whether to analyze incarcerated juvenile’s conditions of 
confinement claims under the due process clause or the Eighth Amendment.76 
This Part describes and compares the two different constitutional standards 
applied by courts to juvenile conditions of confinement claims.77 Section A 
                                                                                                                           
 72 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (establishing citizen’s due process rights); Youngberg v. 
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (holding that an intellectually disabled individual who was involun-
tarily committed to a state institution had constitutionally protected liberty interests under the due 
process clause in the conditions he faced while committed). 
 73 See Alexander S. I, 876 F. Supp. at 798. (holding that the due process clause guarantees the 
juvenile prisoners safety, meaning protection from others and from restrictions on the juveniles’ ac-
tions). 
 74 See Marksamer, supra note 2, at 82 (discussing the constitutional protections to juveniles in 
facilities to be free from harm by other juveniles and officials). 
 75 See id. (discussing how facility officials’ lack of response to abuse violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment rights of the juvenile being harmed and does not serve the purpose of rehabilitating the 
juvenile). 
 76 See Gelin, supra note 49, at 6, 29–31 (arguing that the Supreme Court should provide Eighth 
Amendment protection to incarcerated juveniles rather than relying on the due process clause, though 
it has yet to decide this issue). Compare Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(reviewing the conditions of a state juvenile detention facility under the due process clause, which the 
court stated included the Eighth Amendment standard), Hewett ex rel. H.C. v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080, 
1085 (11th Cir. 1986) (applying the due process clause rather than the Eighth Amendment to a claim 
by a juvenile who was injured by a guard in a juvenile facility), Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 
1179–80 (1st Cir. 1983) (remanding the constitutionality of the isolation of juveniles in an industrial 
school based on the question of legitimate government purpose per the due process standard), Milonas 
v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 942–43 (10th Cir. 1982) (applying the Bell v. Wolfish due process standard 
to a claim against a school for youths with behavior problems placed there by the state), and R.G. v. 
Koller, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1152 (D. Haw. 2006) (applying a due process analysis to the systemic 
harassment of LGBT youth in a juvenile facility), with Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 
249, 261 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that a delinquent juvenile who was incarcerated in a maximum secu-
rity center had a conditions of confinement claim falling within Eighth Amendment, not the Four-
teenth Amendment), Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 144 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that the 
Eighth Amendment Farmer v. Brennan test was the proper standard for a claim based on the sexual 
assault of a juvenile by an official at a juvenile detention facility), and Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 
355 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that the use of beatings and tranquilizing drugs in a juvenile reformatory 
did not meet up to the societal standards of decency and violated the incarcerated juveniles’ Eighth 
Amendment rights). 
77 See infra notes 81–129 and accompanying text. 
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describes decisions of courts that have relied solely on the due process analysis 
for conditions of confinement claims for juveniles.78 Section B describes 
courts that have responded to such claims under the Eighth Amendment, some-
times in conjunction with due process claims.79 Finally, Section C compares 
the differences between the two analyses.80 
A. Courts Which Rely Solely on Substantive Due Process for  
Juvenile Conditions of Confinement Cases 
Courts in several jurisdictions have held that claims relating to conditions 
of confinement in juvenile detention facilities require a due process analysis 
for juvenile detainees and juveniles declared delinquent.81 The reasoning be-
hind this application is that juveniles adjudicated delinquent have not been 
convicted and, because they should have more protections than adult detainees, 
their claims should be analyzed similarly to adult pre-trial detainees through a 
due process analysis.82 
In 2006, in R.G. v. Koller, the U.S. District Court for the District of Ha-
waii held that harassment and isolation used by officials in a juvenile correc-
tional facility against LGBT youth was a violation of the plaintiffs’ substantive 
due process rights.83 The court concluded that the correctional facility’s actions 
were punishment for the juveniles’ identities as LGBT people and were not 
justified by a legitimate governmental purpose.84 In 1979, in Bell v. Wolfish, 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See infra notes 81–97 and accompanying text. 
 79 See infra notes 98–108 and accompanying text. 
 80 See infra notes 109–129 and accompanying text. 
 81 Gary H., 831 F.2d at 1432; Hewett ex rel. H.C., 786 F.2d at 1084–85; Santana, 714 F.2d at 
1179; Milonas, 691 F.2d at 942–43; R.G., 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1152; see also Alexander S. v. Boyd 
(Alexander S. II), 113 F.3d 1373, 1377 n.3 (4th Cir. 1997) (reviewing the conditions at state juvenile 
facilities under the standard of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Gelin, supra 
note 49, at 28–29 (advocating for the extension of Eighth Amendment protections to transgender 
youth incarcerated in detention facilities instead of substantive due process protections). 
 82 R.G., 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1152; see Gary H., 831 F.2d at 1432 (applying the Fourteenth 
Amendment to a conditions of confinement claim because “the Oregon juvenile justice system is 
noncriminal and nonpenal”); Hewett ex rel. H.C., 786 F.2d at 1085 (applying the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to a juvenile detainee’s claim based on his isolation and conditions while confined pending trial 
on delinquency charges); Santana, 714 F.2d at 1179 (noting the more careful due process interest and 
protections entitled to individuals who have not been convicted of a crime); Milonas, 691 F.2d at 942 
(citing Youngberg v. Romeo and Bell to note that people who are involuntarily confined to a state 
institution are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); Gelin, supra note 49, at 29 (discussing the 
logic of applying the due process analysis to juveniles as applied by R.G. v. Koller). 
 83 R.G., 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1154, 1156–57, 1162. 
 84 See id. at 1133, 1152, 1156 (holding that three incarcerated LGBT youth would likely prevail at 
trial in showing that the correctional facility violated their due process rights by failing to protect them 
from relentless abuse). The court found that the facility did not protect LGBT youth from physical and 
psychological abuse, used isolation in misguided, ultimately punitive attempts to protect them, failed 
to create proactive policies to protect them, and failed to use a classification system that would help 
protect them, among other things. See id. at 1157. 
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the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the legitimate governmental purpose 
test should be used to evaluate substantive due process violations in such cir-
cumstances.85 In R.G., the court held that the incarcerated youth had a liberty 
interest in personal security, which was violated by the systemic and continu-
ous harassment against them based on their sexual orientation and gender iden-
tity.86 In its analysis, the court refused to extend Eighth Amendment protection 
to the plaintiffs because it concluded that the Eighth Amendment applies to 
those who have been convicted of crimes, as opposed to the due process 
clause, which applies to those without convictions and juveniles adjudicated 
delinquent.87 Moreover, the court reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment 
was the proper avenue because the systemic treatment of LGBT youth created 
an inference of the officials’ culpability without the requisite finding of intent 
necessary under the Eighth Amendment.88 The Fourteenth Amendment had a 
lower evidentiary bar for the court to meet and enabled this decision to be 
made without the requirements of the Eighth Amendment.89 
Similarly, the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have applied the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to judge state juvenile detention 
facilities.90 In the juvenile justice setting, which is noncriminal, there must be a 
sufficient relationship between the purpose of the incarceration and the treat-
ment of the person incarcerated.91 For example, in 1987, in Gary H. v. Heg-
                                                                                                                           
 85 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537–38 (1979). 
 86 R.G., 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1156. The record showed persistent, continuous harassment, rather 
than a few, discrete incidents. See id. If it had been merely a few, discrete incidents, this treatment 
would have implicated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment, not the due 
process clause. Id. at 1154. 
 87 Id. at 1152. This decision to not extend Eighth Amendment protection to the plaintiffs has been 
criticized by some. See Gelin, supra note 49, at 20 (arguing that society’s “standards of decency” and 
traits unique to juveniles warrant that courts utilize the Eighth Amendment to protect youth in the 
juvenile justice system). 
 88 R.G., 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1154. 
 89 Id. at 1152, 1154 (applying the “more protective” due process standard rather than the Eighth 
Amendment standard to conditions of confinement claims in a juvenile facility); Gorlin, supra note 
39, at 433 (arguing that the substantive due process standard provides greater protections than the 
Eighth Amendment standard, which only creates a low baseline for the rights of pretrial detainees). 
Although the Eighth Amendment provides prisoners’ protection only to the extent conditions are 
“cruel and unusual,” substantive due process has no such limitations and offers protection for “funda-
mental liberties.” Gorlin, supra note 39, at 436. 
 90 See, e.g., Gary H., 831 F.2d at 1431–32; Hewett ex rel. H.C., 786 F.2d at 1084–85; Milonas, 
691 F.2d at 942; Alexander S. v. Boyd (Alexander S. I), 876 F. Supp. 773, 795–96 (D.S.C. 1995) 
(applying the due process standard to evaluate conditions of juveniles’ confinement). 
 91 See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that a detainee who is committed 
only because he is unable to proceed to trial cannot be held for longer than the time reasonably neces-
sary to discover if he will be able to stand trial in the future). Moreover, in 1982, in Youngberg v. 
Romeo, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the due process clause guarantees involuntary committed 
individuals reasonably safe conditions of confinement. 457 U.S. 307, 315–16, 319, 324 (1982). This 
included physical safety and protection from overly restrictive conditions of confinement that unduly 
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strom, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the protections offered by 
the due process clause included those of the Eighth Amendment, so the due 
process standard was the appropriate standard to review the conditions in a 
facility for the juvenile wards of the court.92 The reasoning behind the applica-
tion of the more protective substantive due process standard was the status of 
the detainees, as juveniles who had not been convicted and thus deserved more 
protection.93 
Likewise, in 1997, in Alexander S. v. Boyd (“Alexander S. I”), the District 
Court of South Carolina heard a case where incarcerated juveniles challenged 
the conditions of confinement of the correctional facilities operated by the 
South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice.94 The court concluded that its 
role was limited to creating the minimal standards for constitutional violations 
on this issue, because of the two potentially contrasting concerns: juvenile re-
habilitation and the crime rate.95 The court determined that the due process 
clause was the appropriate constitutional standard to apply to conditions at the 
juvenile facilities because the juveniles were adjudicated delinquent, not con-
victed as adult criminals.96 The court noted that the protections offered by the 
due process clause encompassed the lesser protections of the Eighth Amend-
ment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment because the due process clause is 
more broadly applicable to liberty interests.97 
B. Courts That Rely on the Eighth Amendment for Juvenile  
Conditions of Confinement Cases 
Conversely, in 1994, in Farmer v. Brennan, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that prison officials may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for deny-
ing humane conditions of confinement when they are aware of the “substantial 
risk of serious harm” facing detainees and fail to limit this risk through reason-
                                                                                                                           
restrict freedom of action and are not reasonably related to legitimate security and safety needs. Id. at 
324. 
 92 Gary H., 831 F.2d at 1432. 
 93 Id. at 1432, 1437; supra notes 37–44 and accompanying text (examining the substantive due 
process standard). 
 94 Alexander S. I, 876 F. Supp. at 777. 
 95 Id. at 779. The court concluded that the rehabilitative efforts of the South Carolina Department 
of Juvenile Justice were ineffective and were returning juveniles back to the world with higher chanc-
es of engaging in crime than before, increasing rates of recidivism. Id. at 780. The court also recog-
nized several liberty interests of the plaintiffs, including the right to sufficient medical care and suffi-
cient programming. Id. at 788, 790. Programming was deemed sufficient if it allowed juveniles the 
chance to be rehabilitated per the purpose of their confinement, to protect both them and prison offi-
cials, and to ensure society’s safety once they were released. Id. at 790. 
 96 Id. at 796. 
 97 Id. (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671–72 n.40 (1977) (stating that the Eighth 
Amendment analysis applies only after the state has provided the due process protections relevant to 
criminal conviction, thus giving the state the right to impose punishment)). 
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able steps.98 The Court relied on precedent, stating that the Constitution does 
not require that prisons be comfortable, but it also does not allow them to be 
unnecessarily cruel for adult prisoners.99 Prison conditions for adults may be 
restrictive, but may not unnecessarily allow for harm that serves no legitimate 
punitive purpose.100 This Eighth Amendment standard is much higher than that 
expected of due process claims because Eighth Amendment claims require 
proof of the subjective state of mind of officials, which is not implicated in the 
context of due process claims.101 
Nonetheless, some courts, including the Third and Seventh Circuits do re-
ly on the Eighth Amendment for juvenile conditions of confinement cases.102 
In 2001, in Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that an Eighth Amendment analysis was proper to evaluate claims of sexual 
assault by a facility official brought by two female juveniles in a juvenile facil-
ity.103 The court applied the two-step Farmer test to hold in favor of all but one 
defendant prison official who knew about the actions of the facility official 
who assaulted the girls.104 The Third Circuit has stated that allegations con-
cerning conditions of confinement by juveniles adjudicated delinquent are 
properly analyzed under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and un-
usual punishment.105 Other courts have held that juvenile conditions of con-
finement cases should be examined under the Eighth Amendment, by justify-
ing juvenile cases as somewhat criminal in nature, subject to similar proce-
dures as criminal court and utilizing confinement as a form of punishment.106 
For example, in 2011, in Troy D. v. Mickens, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of New Jersey held that the juvenile plaintiffs’ claims that their 
                                                                                                                           
 98 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994) (holding that a court could potentially find 
that the official knew of the risk present because of the presence of continuous, well-reported attacks 
against the detainee). The complaint alleged that, as a pre-operative, transsexual female, the plaintiff 
was especially prone to be subjected to sexual attack and, despite knowledge of this risk, the defend-
ants placed the plaintiff in the general population. Id. at 830–31. 
 99 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981)). 
 100 Id. at 833 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 548 (1984) (holding that there was no legit-
imate punitive justification for the seizure of the plaintiff’s letters and legal documents, his private 
property, because it did not threaten the security of the institution)). 
 101 R.G., 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1152; Gorlin, supra note 39, at 439–43 (arguing that the Court in Bell 
intended to use an objective standard for the substantive due process analysis, in keeping with the 
principles underlying due process). 
 102 See, e.g., Betts, 621 F.3d at 261 (describing the Eighth Amendment analysis); Beers-Capitol, 
256 F.3d at 125, 130 (same); Nelson, 491 F.2d at 355 (same). 
 103 Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 130 & n.5. 
 104 Id. at 141, 144. 
 105 Betts, 621 F.3d at 261. 
 106 See Nelson, 491 F.2d at 357 (holding that the objective of the state incarcerating juveniles to 
protect society did not justify the use of beating and tranquilizers and amounted to “cruel and unusual” 
punishment); In re J.M., 287 S.W.3d 481, 492 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009) (applying the Eighth Amendment 
to the constitutional claim against a juvenile facility because juvenile cases are “quasi-criminal” and 
often have constitutional concerns that are similar to criminal law). 
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prolonged periods of isolation of up to 178 days while in custody, which 
caused severe psychological harm, were properly analyzed under the Eighth 
Amendment.107 Using the Eighth Amendment standard, the court required 
proof that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference under the Farmer 
test, which resulted in a denial of the motions to dismiss the claims.108 
C. Does an Eighth Amendment or a Substantive Due Process  
Analysis Really Make a Difference in Litigation of  
Conditions of Confinement Claims? 
LGBT youth, particularly transgender youth, face unique psychological, 
physical, and sexual trauma in detention facilities, resulting in litigation over 
the negative conditions of their confinement.109 These youth are at particular 
risk for abuse while in detention.110 Often LGBT youth are ignored by staff 
when verbal and physical abuse occurs, leaving them nowhere to turn for re-
course.111 Under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”), 
the DOJ has been granted the power to investigate constitutional violations 
against youth in juvenile justice facilities, including instances when facility 
officials do not protect LGBT youth from physical harm, the denial of medical 
treatment, and the segregation of LGBT youth without cause.112 In evaluating 
constitutional violations, the test applied, whether due process or Eighth 
Amendment, can make all the difference.113 In evaluating conditions of con-
finement claims based on the isolation of incarcerated juveniles, the applica-
                                                                                                                           
 107 See Troy D. v. Mickens, 806 F. Supp. 2d 758, 762, 765, 772 (D.N.J. 2011) (holding that plain-
tiffs were juveniles adjudicated delinquent, as opposed to pre-trial detainees, so their conditions of 
confinement claims was properly analyzed under the Eighth Amendment, not under the due process 
clause as alleged by the plaintiffs). 
 108 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 837; Troy D. 806 F. Supp. 2d at 772–73. 
 109 See HUNT & MOODIE-MILLS, supra note 11, at 5–6; WILBER ET AL., supra note 18, at x n.2 
(describing various conditions facing incarcerated LGBT youth). 
 110 See HUNT & MOODIE-MILLS, supra note 11, at 6 (describing the abuses facing incarcerated 
LGBT youth). 
 111 See WILBER ET AL., supra note 18, at 7 (discussing the stigmatization and discrimination 
LGBT youth face in prison). 
 112 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF LESBIAN, GAY, 
BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND INTERSEX INDIVIDUALS 34 (Oct. 2016), http://www.justice.gov/crt/
page/file/910161/download [https://perma.cc/EE68-B7YH] (summarizing the work that the U.S. De-
partment of Justice (“DOJ”) has undertaken to protect the rights of LGBTI individuals). After years of 
applying the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”), the DOJ has facilitated state 
reforms as to means of accountability, investigation into improper conduct, prisoner screening, and 
reporting in order to protect LGBT youth from harm. Id. at 35–37. 
 113 See Gorlin, supra note 39, at 443 (discussing why the Eighth Amendment analysis is not 
enough to evaluate conditions of confinement claims by pre-trial detainees). 
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tion of these tests provided very different results, with more protections to ju-
veniles provided by the due process test.114 
The objective test of substantive due process claims provides the oppor-
tunity for the factfinder to make their determination solely by evaluating the 
conditions of confinement, rather than evaluating the unknown and subjective 
intent of prison officials, as required under the Eighth Amendment.115 This of-
fers a lower burden, in which detainees are only required to show that the harm 
caused to them lacks a reasonable relationship to the government’s objec-
tive.116 Due process violations may still follow from injuries that rise above the 
level of negligence by facility officials, but less than an intentional action, as 
required by the subjective standard of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.117 
In 1982, in Youngberg v. Romeo, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
Eighth Amendment is more narrowly applicable in protecting convicted pris-
oner’s rights than substantive due process for non-convicted individuals, be-
cause persons who have been involuntarily committed are treated more gently 
than criminals whose confinement is designed to punish.118 In Youngberg, the 
Court relied on the accepted notion that pre-trial imprisonment is not for pun-
ishment, but is for “safe custody.”119 Because of this sole purpose, it is accept-
ed that pre-trial prisoners may not be unnecessarily restricted or harmed be-
yond the measures needed for safe confinement.120 
In Youngberg, the Supreme Court, for the first time, considered the sub-
stantive due process rights of an involuntarily committed, intellectually disa-
bled person under the Fourteenth Amendment.121 The Court acknowledged the 
                                                                                                                           
 114 Compare Troy D., 806 F. Supp. 3d at 773 (applying an Eighth Amendment analysis to juve-
niles adjudicated delinquent, requiring a determination of the subjective intent of the defendants in 
regard to the conditions of the juveniles’ confinement), with R.G., 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 (applying a 
due process analysis to the systemic harassment of LGBT youth in a juvenile facility to determine that 
this treatment fell below the minimum level of care required by the due process clause). 
 115 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Bell, 441 U.S at 535, 538; Gorlin, supra note 39, at 443. 
 116 Bell, 441 U.S. at 538–39; Gorlin, supra note 39, at 443. 
 117 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 534; Gorlin, 
supra note 39, at 427. 
 118 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321–22, 325. 
 119 See id. at 309–10, 324 (discussing the fact that the petitioner’s mother was no longer able to 
provide him with care and he could not care for himself, requiring his involuntary commitment); 4 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *297 (arguing that prisoners awaiting trial are entitled to 
more considerate treatment than are convicted inmates). 
 120 BLACKSTONE, supra note 119, at *297. 
 121 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 314; Rosalie Berger Levinson, Wherefore Art Thou Romeo: Revitaliz-
ing Youngberg’s Protection of Liberty for the Civilly Committed, 54 B.C. L. REV. 535, 536 (2013). 
The Supreme Court did not even consider the rights of the respondent under the Eighth Amendment, 
relying on the Third Circuit, which held the Eighth Amendment did not apply when evaluating the 
liberty rights of the involuntarily committed. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 312. The Third Circuit denied 
the use of the Eighth Amendment standard, because of the holding that the criminally convicted 
should be reviewed under the cruel and unusual standard, which did not apply to the civil confinement 
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right to personal security, which was a “historic liberty interest” substantively 
protected by the due process clause.122 The Court concluded that the plaintiff’s 
liberty interests require the state to provide sufficient care and medical treat-
ment, as reasonable, to him.123 Following the purpose of the detainment, for 
“safe custody,” the involuntarily committed, who lack similar mental culpabil-
ity to pre-trial prisoners, should be more protected than convicted adults.124 
Although Youngberg does not explicitly extend a substantive due process 
right to juveniles and other non-criminally committed individuals, the Court 
did establish the state’s obligation of care to put into place such measures to 
provide for the safety and protection of the intellectually challenged plain-
tiff.125 The underlying purpose of the confinement in Youngberg is similar to 
juvenile confinement cases, which are non-punitive but custodial.126 The ado-
lescent development cases in Supreme Court jurisprudence emphasize that 
more protection is offered to youth in the justice system than adults because of 
the lack of culpability and the unique nature of juveniles in the justice sys-
tem.127 Federal officials should provide at least the same amount of safety and 
protection to incarcerated LGBT juveniles as that provided to the intellectually 
challenged plaintiff in Youngberg.128 Using this same reasoning, conditions of 
                                                                                                                           
at issue. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 1980). The court relied on Ingraham v. 
Wright and Bell to avoid the application of the Eighth Amendment. Id. 
 122 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315 (quoting Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673). 
 123 Id. at 319. The Court agreed with the Third Circuit’s assertion that the existence of a constitu-
tional right to care and treatment is not a new legal standard, but an established constitutional right. Id. 
(citing Romeo, 644 F.2d at 176). Furthermore, the Court affirmed the Third Circuit in holding that the 
Constitution requires only that facility staff use their own informed discretion to ensure adequate 
conditions for those who are involuntarily committed. Id. at 321 (citing Romeo, 644 F.2d at 178). The 
Court relied on Jackson v. Indiana, establishing that there must be a relationship between the condi-
tions of confinement and the objective of the confinement. Id. at 324; Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738. In 
order to make their determination, the Court balanced the liberty interests of the plaintiff against legit-
imate state objectives. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324. 
 124 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 309–10 (describing the plaintiff’s severe intellectual disability war-
ranting his involuntary commitment); BLACKSTONE, supra note 119, at *297. In Youngberg, the pur-
pose of the plaintiff’s confinement was to protect him and those around him because he was unable to 
care for himself, was prone to violence, and was unable to control his violence. Youngberg, 457 U.S. 
at 309–10. 
 125 See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 319 (describing the rights given to the involuntarily, civilly incar-
cerated); Michael J. Dale, Lawsuits and Public Policy: The Role of Litigation in Correcting Condi-
tions in Juvenile Detention Centers, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 675, 701–02 (1998) (arguing that the authority 
established by Youngberg is most in line with civilly committed, juvenile detainees in keeping with 
the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile justice system); see also Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 554 
(1966) (establishing the objectives of the juvenile court to guide and rehabilitate the child). Despite 
this non-punitive purpose, the juvenile justice system has been impacted by pressure to be tough on 
crime, resulting in a system of punitive conditions that need judicial remedies. Dale, supra, at 677–79. 
 126 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 309–10; Kent, 383 U.S. at 554. 
 127 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010); 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572–73 (2005); see also supra note 61 and accompanying text (in-
troducing the adolescent development cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court). 
 128 Dale, supra note 125, at 701–02. 
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confinement claims brought on behalf of incarcerated LGBT youth should uti-
lize the substantive due process test, not the Eighth Amendment test.129 
IV. COURTS SHOULD DECIDE CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT CASES  
FOR LGBT YOUTH IN CUSTODY UNDER THE SUBSTANTIVE  
DUE PROCESS RIGHT 
This Part advocates for the use of the due process clause for conditions of 
confinement cases in the juvenile justice system in order to provide a systemic 
remedy for LGBT youth against the inhumane conditions they face within this 
system.130 Section A explains why the substantive due process analysis is more 
in line with the purpose of the juvenile justice system than the Eighth Amend-
ment analysis and addresses the opposing view.131 Then, Section B applies and 
compares the due process clause and the Eighth Amendment tests to evaluate 
how such analyses would apply to the systemic issue of incarcerated LGBT 
youth facing horrible discrimination and abuse.132 
A. Why the Due Process Clause Is a Better Option 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question of whether 
persons involuntarily confined in juvenile institutions must meet the burden of 
an Eighth Amendment analysis or, alternatively, a substantive due process 
analysis, to allege a constitutional violation for the conditions of their con-
finement.133 Conditions of confinement claims for LGBT juveniles should be 
brought under the substantive due process clause because it provides a greater 
breadth of protection for the injured to prove a constitutional violation.134 This 
more protective stance embodies the rehabilitative intent of the juvenile justice 
                                                                                                                           
 129 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; id. XIV, § 1; Youngberg, 457 U.S at 320; Kent, 383 U.S. at 554. 
Compare Bell, 441 U.S at 535, 538 (establishing the substantive due process test), with Farmer, 511 
U.S. at 837 (establishing the cruel and unusual punishment test). 
 130 See infra notes 133–186 and accompanying text. 
 131 See infra notes 133–155 and accompanying text. 
 132 See infra notes 156–186 and accompanying text. 
 133 Gelin, supra note 49, at 30. Under the substantive due process jurisprudence, the Supreme 
Court has not clarified the scope of protection offered to juveniles in the justice system. Dale, supra 
note 125, at 700. 
 134 See Gorlin, supra note 39, at 438 (relying on the reasoning in Youngberg to stand for the idea 
that a substantive due process claim would provide protection to a larger class of individuals because 
it does not only apply to convicted individuals, but to involuntarily committed individuals). Critics 
would argue that a juvenile detainee cannot be equated with a person with an intellectual disability, 
because the detainee would have had to have committed a crime to become a detainee, which is not 
the case for those with an intellectual disability. Dale, supra note 125, at 702. Because of the adoles-
cent development cases, however, and the history of juvenile justice, the Court has still placed juve-
niles at a different level of culpability than adult criminals. Id. This is because of the different state 
objectives in the juvenile versus adult justice systems and the unique nature of juveniles themselves, 
who require more protection. Id. 
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system more than the punitive model of the adult justice system because it 
provides more opportunity for judicial remedy of infringements on the rights 
and safety of juveniles.135 Due to the severe conditions disparately impacting 
LGBT youth in the juvenile justice system and the difficulty in proving the 
intent of officials who create these conditions, conditions of confinement cases 
for LGBT youth should be litigated through this substantive due process stand-
ard.136 
In 2006, in R.G. v. Koller, the U.S. District Court for the District of Ha-
waii decided a seminal case involving the isolation and harsh treatment of a 
gay girl, a boy who was perceived to be gay, and a transgender girl in a juve-
nile detention facility.137 In that case, the isolation practices at the facility in 
question were inherently punitive, but the court found that the Eighth Amend-
ment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment was not the correct 
constitutional standard to apply to the case.138 The Eighth Amendment is not 
applicable to youth who have been detained or adjudicated delinquent and 
cannot be treated as sentenced adult inmates.139 Instead, the court applied the 
“more protective” Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process standard to 
evaluate the juvenile detention facility’s liability.140 
Although the Supreme Court has not yet determined what standard to uti-
lize in juvenile conditions of confinement cases, they should not utilize the 
Eighth Amendment because it is less protective than the due process clause.141 
Again, this is due to the understanding in Supreme Court jurisprudence that 
juveniles must be treated differently than adults and protected by the state, as 
evidenced by the Court’s willingness to limit sentencing because of perpetra-
tors’ youth.142 Specifically, in 2012, in Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court 
clarified that nothing established in earlier jurisprudence regarding children is 
                                                                                                                           
 135 See Marksamer, supra note 2, at 75–76, 83 (arguing that despite the rehabilitative model of the 
juvenile justice system, it has had higher rates of incarceration and has become more punitive in na-
ture, rather than oriented toward treatment). 
 136 Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987); MAJD ET AL., supra note 4, at 1, 
51–52, 104. Compare Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 538 (1979) (analyzing substantive due pro-
cess claims through an objective standard), with Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (ana-
lyzing Eighth Amendment claims through a subjective standard). 
 137 R.G. v. Koller, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1133–34 (D. Haw. 2006). 
 138 Id. at 1152, 1154. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. (quoting Gary H., 831 F.2d at 1432). 
 141 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 n.37 (1977); Gary H., 831 F.2d at 1432; Gelin, supra 
note 49, at 30. 
 142 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2458 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010); 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570–71 (2005); see also supra note 61 and accompanying text (in-
troducing the adolescent development cases decided by the Supreme Court). 
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applicable to only certain crimes.143 The underlying reasoning of the Supreme 
Court adolescent development cases is that the Court must be more protective 
of juveniles than adults when imposing penalties.144 Extending the same ra-
tionale, the Court must consider conditions of confinement claims against ju-
veniles differently than adults, because children are inherently vulnerable and 
the justice system seeks to rehabilitate rather than punish them.145 
Nonetheless, some scholars would argue that the Eighth Amendment is 
the constitutional standard under which conditions of confinement claims 
evaluated in juvenile detention facilities, even though they have not been con-
victed of a crime as required for Eighth Amendment claims.146 In 1977, in In-
graham v. Wright, the Supreme Court held that some punishments, though not 
criminal, may be similar enough to criminal punishments to apply the Eighth 
Amendment analysis to the conditions.147 Proponents of the Eighth Amend-
ment justify the application of an Eighth Amendment analysis because of the 
need to uphold “evolving standards of human decency.”148 
To justify the reliance on the Eighth Amendment, proponents rely on the 
2010 U.S. Supreme Court case Roper v. Simmons, which examined “evolving 
standards” of decency through both an objective and subjective lens to deter-
mine which punishments are so disproportionate as to be “cruel and unusu-
al.”149 According to some scholars, the Court’s acknowledgement of the dimin-
                                                                                                                           
 143 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2458 (holding that the reasoning in Graham v. Florida, highlighting the 
importance of youth in determining the appropriateness of a lifetime of incarceration, applied to man-
datory penalty schemes that prevented the sentence from considering youth). 
 144 Id.; Graham, 560 U.S. at 74; Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. 
 145 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 2475. 
 146 See Gelin, supra note 49, at 32–33 (arguing that the Eighth Amendment analysis must be 
tailored to the maturity levels of incarcerated juveniles and evolving standards of human decency). 
 147 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 669 n.37. 
 148 Gelin, supra note 49, at 33 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)). In Estelle v. 
Gamble, the Court explained that the ideals of decency create a duty on the government to provide 
sufficient medical care for those whom it has confined in prison. See 429 U.S. at 103. This includes 
the obligation of prison authorities to treat inmates’ needs. See id. Under the Eighth Amendment ju-
risprudence, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitute unnecessary and 
wanton infliction of pain. Id. at 104 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (2002) (holding that 
the legislature may weigh retribution and deterrence as considerations as to the form of punishment 
and effect on the prisoner)). 
149 See Gelin, supra note 49, at 35–36 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 561, 564 (“evolving standards 
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society to determine which punishments are so dis-
proportionate as to be cruel and unusual”) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Justice Kennedy, writ-
ing for the majority in Roper v. Simmons, examined the laws of the various states and concluded that a 
majority no longer allowed juveniles under the age of eighteen to be sentenced to death (objective 
criteria). 543 U.S. at 568. Moreover, Justice Kennedy ultimately recognized the diminished culpability 
of juveniles (subjective criteria). Id. at 568, 571. Justice Kennedy has been particularly receptive to 
the use of substantive due process to protect the liberty interests of individual citizens. See, e.g., Unit-
ed States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013) (overturning the Defense of Marriage Act 
because no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose to single out same-sex couples who are entitled 
to protection of their liberty—due process and equal protection interests). 
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ished culpability and comparative immaturity of juveniles provides a rationale 
to extend Eighth Amendment protections to them in detention centers.150 The 
diminished culpability of juveniles, however, better justifies the use of the due 
process clause to protect incarcerated LGBT youth from punitive conditions, 
because it utilizes a clear, objective test, rather than an amorphous, subjective 
intent test.151 
The Supreme Court has recognized the right to personal security as a lib-
erty interest protected substantively by the due process clause.152 This right 
does not disappear merely because confinement is lawful.153 If it is unconstitu-
tional to hold a convicted criminal in unsafe conditions, then the involuntarily 
committed must be held to at least the same standard of safety, as they are not 
held for punitive purposes.154 This rationale suggests that a higher protection is 
offered to those who are involuntarily committed, such as juveniles, than only 
to those who are convicted of a crime and whom the justice system seeks to 
punish.155 
B. Implications for Incarcerated LGBT Youth 
Although the juvenile justice system is grounded in a rehabilitative phi-
losophy, many juvenile justice courts and facilities have moved away from this 
original intent toward harsher treatment of juveniles.156 More and more young 
people are incarcerated in prison-like facilities because of public pressure to 
come down hard on juvenile offenders.157 A 2010 survey by Ceres Policy Re-
search illustrated that LGBT youth are more likely to be detained pre-trial for a 
variety of minor crimes, including truancy and other non-violent offenses, re-
sulting in a large number of LGBT youth cycling through an abusive justice 
                                                                                                                           
 150 Gelin, supra note 49, at 36–37 (justifying this extension by looking to evolving standards of 
decency). 
 151 See MAJD ET AL., supra note 4, at 1, 4, 12, 77, 107 (describing the various objective, negative 
conditions affecting incarcerated LGBT youth); supra note 61 and accompanying text (introducing the 
adolescent development cases decided by the United States Supreme Court). Compare Farmer, 511 
U.S. at 837 (establishing the Eighth Amendment test), with Bell, 441 U.S at 535, 538 (establishing the 
substantive due process test). 
 152 See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673–74 (describing this liberty interest, including freedom from 
bodily restraint and punishment except in accordance with due process of law). 
 153 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982) (holding that the fact that the plaintiff was 
involuntarily committed does not deprive him of substantive liberty interests). 
 154 See id. at 315–16 (making a corollary between previous jurisprudence which held that it is 
cruel and unusual punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions and the same for the 
involuntarily committed). 
 155 Id. 
 156 See Marksamer, supra note 2, at 75 (reflecting a more punitive model going against the phi-
losophy of the juvenile system). 
 157 See Dale, supra note 125, at 677 (discussing the system’s tough on crime attitude, which has 
resulted in a more punitive system than intended); Marksamer, supra note 2, at 75. 
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system throughout their lives.158 Rough estimates of the New York juvenile 
justice system indicate LGBT youth constitute between four to ten percent of 
the people in the juvenile justice system, though numbers are likely much 
higher.159 
Moreover, LGBT juveniles are constantly facing harsh treatment as pun-
ishment for their actions and identities, contrary to the rehabilitative philoso-
phy that is supposed to underlie the system.160 LGBT youth face violence, iso-
lation, and discrimination in the juvenile justice system due to their real or per-
ceived gender identity and/or sexuality, often with the acknowledgement of 
facility staff.161 
Due to the systemic discrimination against LGBT youth in the juvenile 
justice system, especially against transgender youth, there is a need for litiga-
tion as a means to remedy and reform this pervasive mistreatment.162 Under 
the substantive due process analysis established by the Supreme Court in 1979 
in Bell v. Wolfish, a large class of transgender-identified juveniles facing sys-
temic mistreatment will receive judicial relief without having to prove the 
more burdensome standard of subjective intent under the Eighth Amend-
ment.163 The disparate physical and sexual violence, isolation, and discrimina-
tion against all LGBT youth fit the first prong of the Bell test, restrictive condi-
tions that harm these youth beyond mere comfort, such that it becomes puni-
                                                                                                                           
 158 See Irvine, supra note 4, at 693 (describing a national survey of the juvenile justice system to 
highlight the disproportionate incarceration of LGBT youth and the horrible treatment they face). 
LGBT youth have twice the likelihood of being detained for non-violent crimes. Id. at 689, 693. 
 159 See RANDI FEINSTEIN ET AL., JUSTICE FOR ALL?: A REPORT ON LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL 
AND TRANSGENDERED YOUTH IN THE NEW YORK JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 6 (2001) (describing a 
study chronicling the experiences of LGBT youth in the New York juvenile justice system, commis-
sioned by the Lesbian and Gay Youth Project of the Urban Justice Center). Due to the overrepresenta-
tion of LGBT youth in the juvenile system and a lack of accurate reporting, this percentage is likely 
much higher. Id. 
 160 See MAJD ET AL., supra note 4, at 103–12 (describing the unsafe conditions and lack of pro-
tection for LGBT youth); Dale, supra note 125, at 677–78 (describing the increasingly harsh punish-
ment facing juveniles in the justice system); Marksamer, supra note 2, at 74–75 (describing the impact 
of abuse by peers and staff on transgender youth). In recent years, protections and attempted reforms 
for children in the juvenile justice system have been limited and unsuccessful. Dale, supra note 125, at 
678. Thus, more and more lawsuits have arisen to counteract the harms to juveniles in the justice sys-
tem. Id. at 678–79. 
 161 See MAJD ET AL., supra note 4, at 103–06 (describing the need for such a check to protect the 
rights of LGBT youth). 
 162 See Valentine, supra note 13, at 1095 (discussing the lack of progress in reform and protec-
tions for LGBT youth in the welfare system, including the juvenile justice system). 
 163 See Gorlin, supra note 39, at 438 (describing the higher ceiling for substantive due process 
claims brought by non-convicted individuals). Compare Bell, 441 U.S. at 538–39 (establishing the 
substantive due process standard), and R.G., 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 (applying the due process test to 
the conditions facing incarcerated LGBT youth), with Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (establishing the 
Eighth Amendment standard), and Troy D. v. Mickens, 806 F. Supp. 2d 758, 773 (D.N.J. 2011) (ap-
plying the Eighth Amendment standard to claims arising from isolation of incarcerated youth). 
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tive.164 For example, as noted earlier, the APA has found that isolation in incar-
ceration is inherently punitive and thus is likely to have long-term emotional 
and mental impact for transgender youth.165 Similarly, the United Nations has 
also found that the isolation of prisoners may be torture in certain circumstanc-
es and can result in abuse beyond the purpose of the justice system.166 Addi-
tionally, courts have held that long-term segregation or isolation of youth is a 
punitive practice that does not fit within the rehabilitative model of the juve-
nile justice system.167 Thus, the systemic practice of isolating transgender 
youth is punitive and meets the first prong of the Bell test.168 The evidence of 
the conditions facing LGBT youth in the justice system, often with the 
acknowledgement of prison staff, suggests that the treatment of LGBT youth is 
punishment for LGBT youth’s gender identity.169 
Under the second prong of the Bell test, there is no legitimate government 
purpose for the conditions that LGBT youth face, beyond punishing these 
youth for their gender expression or attempting to have them conform to gen-
der norms.170 Similarly, under the rational basis test of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s equal protection clause, if a law does not burden a fundamental right or 
target a suspect class, the legislative classification and resulting disadvantage 
to various groups or persons will be upheld if it is rationally related to a legiti-
mate end.171 Nevertheless, if the law is merely imposed based on animus to-
ward a person or group, it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state inter-
                                                                                                                           
 164 Bell, 441 U.S. at 538; MAJD ET AL., supra note 4, at 103–06. 
 165 HUNT & MOODIE-MILLS, supra note 11, at 1, 6. 
 166 Interim Rep. of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment on Its Sixty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/63/175, at 1, 18, 23 (July 28, 2008) (bringing attention to the mental and physical suffering that 
solitary confinement creates, which amounts to punishment and increases the risk of torture going 
undetected). 
 167 R.G., 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1148–49; Lollis v. N.Y. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 322 F. Supp. 473, 478 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (granting motions for temporary injunctions based on evidence that children in state 
training schools had been confined in isolated rooms). 
 168 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 538–39 (establishing that the practice first must be punitive); HUNT & 
MOODIE-MILLS, supra note 11, at 6 (describing the abuse and isolation facing incarcerated trans-
gender youth, which amounts to punishment); MAJD ET AL., supra note 4, at 1, 4, 12, 77, 107 (describ-
ing the practices and treatment of LGBT youth in the justice system). 
 169 See R.G., 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1154–55 (applying only to the persistent isolation of the LGBT 
youth); MAJD ET AL., supra note 4, at 103–06 (describing the facilitation of abuse of transgender 
youth by facility staff, as well as punitive practices for their gender expression). 
 170 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 538–39 (establishing the second prong of the substantive due process 
test); HUNT & MOODIE-MILLS, supra note 11, at 6 (describing the justifications for the isolation and 
treatment of transgender youth). 
171 See Romer v. Evans, 417 U.S. 620, 631–36 (1996) (holding that Colorado laws classifying 
homosexual persons violated the equal protection clause because they do not rationally relate to a 
proper legislative end and instead were motivated only by animus toward the class of people). 
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ests.172 Although prison officials often justify isolation for the safety of the 
LGBT person or for other juveniles, this disparate treatment is based on the 
assumption that LGBT youth are sexual predators, thus intended with specific 
animus toward LGBT youth.173 Most often, placement in isolation is related to 
an LGBT youth’s gender expression and/or sexual orientation, which is not a 
legitimate state interest and is unrelated to the safety interests espoused.174 
Moreover, even assuming that the governmental purpose of isolation to 
achieve safety is legitimate, the means to achieve this safety appear excessive 
and harmful to the juveniles affected, in proportion to the alleged governmen-
tal interest in safety, per the second prong in Bell.175 
Should LGBT juveniles need to bear the greater burden of proving cruel 
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment for conditions of their 
incarceration, it will be much harder for them to receive necessary relief.176 By 
comparing two cases, both regarding a conditions of confinement claim for the 
prolonged isolation of incarcerated juveniles, it is apparent that the different 
constitutional tests provided vastly different results.177 In 2011, in Troy D. v. 
Mickens, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey relied on the 
Eighth Amendment’s deliberate indifference standard, requiring proof of indif-
ference in determining whether the juveniles’ prolonged isolation and lack of 
mental health care was a plausible constitutional violation.178 This case alleged 
similar constitutional violations as R.G., namely prolonged isolation, but re-
                                                                                                                           
172 See id. at 632 (requiring a rational requirement between the classification and a legitimate 
end); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 443 (1985) (applying a stronger 
standard of judicial review to an equal protection claim because of a continuing prejudice toward 
“mentally retarded” people). 
 173 See WILBER ET AL., supra note 18, at 7 (describing the stigmatization of LGBT youth based 
on their perceived predatory nature). 
 174 See MAJD ET AL., supra note 4, at 106 (describing the APA’s finding that this is punishment); 
Estrada & Marksamer, supra note 13, at 428 (describing that this practice is unconstitutionally puni-
tive even with the safety justification, which could be alleviated in other ways). 
 175 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 538–39 (establishing the test for substantive due process); MAJD ET AL., 
supra note 4, at 106–07 (discussing the substantive due process test); Estrada & Marksamer, supra 
note 13, at 428–29 (same). To determine whether a condition is an incident of a legitimate govern-
mental purpose, the Court looks at whether it appears excessive in relation to an alternative rationally 
connected to the condition. Bell, 441 U.S. at 538. This may amount to the condition being “arbitrary 
and purposeless” such that the Court can infer that the condition is punitive. Id. at 539. 
 176 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Troy D., 806 F. Supp. 3d at 773. 
 177 Compare Troy D., 806 F. Supp. 3d at 773 (applying an Eighth Amendment analysis to juve-
niles adjudicated delinquent, requiring a determination of the subjective intent of the defendants in 
regard to the conditions of the juveniles’ confinement), with R.G., 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 (applying a 
due process analysis to the systemic harassment of LGBT youth in a juvenile facility to determine that 
this treatment fell below the minimum level of care required by the due process clause). 
 178 Troy D., 806 F. Supp. 3d at 763 (holding that the deprivation of other company and medical 
attention for post-delinquent adjudication fits into an Eighth Amendment claim, thus making no dis-
tinction that the detainees were juveniles). The court equates a delinquent adjudication with a convic-
tion, thus presuming the punitive nature of the juvenile delinquency adjudication in contravention of 
the juvenile justice system. Id. at 772; Dale, supra note 125, at 701–02. 
2017] Transgender Youth and the Juvenile Justice System 377 
quired further inquiry into the minds of the facility officials to prove their sub-
jective intent as to the isolation of the plaintiffs.179 The due process test pro-
vides broader protection to transgender-identified youth facing the many harm-
ful conditions of confinement resulting from being an LGBT person in a juve-
nile facility.180 
Because of the need to systematically reform the juvenile system in terms 
of treatment of incarcerated youth, the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ is 
uniquely placed to make the most impact through due process litigation.181 
CRIPA gives power to the U.S. Attorney General and thus the DOJ to investi-
gate juvenile detention centers for unconstitutional, punitive conditions.182 This 
statute also allows the DOJ to sue states or local governments for equitable 
relief to correct systemic, problematic conditions, most effectively through the 
substantive due process claim established in Bell.183 In 2003, in an effort to 
protect incarcerated individuals from sexual assault, the Prison Rape Elimina-
tion Act was signed into law, followed by DOJ regulations for implementa-
tion.184 The DOJ made note of the particular vulnerability of LGBT youth to 
sexual assault, suggesting a potential for DOJ awareness and action to remedy 
the pervasive, punitive abuse facing incarcerated LGBT youth.185 Thus, along 
                                                                                                                           
 179 Compare Troy D., 806 F. Supp. 3d at 772–73 (requiring a subjective standard of inquiry), with 
R.G., 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 (requiring an objective standard of inquiry). 
 180 Compare Troy D., 806 F. Supp. 3d at 773 (holding that an issue of material fact existed as to 
the deliberate indifference of the defendants), with R.G., 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 (holding that LGBT 
youth had their due process rights violated because of extended isolation); see also MAJD ET AL., 
supra note 4, at 103–06 (describing some of the intentional and negligent actions taken by facilities to 
perpetuate discrimination and harassment against LGBT youth); Gorlin, supra note 39, at 438 (de-
scribing the Court’s reasoning in Youngberg and the implication that there is a higher ceiling of pris-
oner’s rights for non-convicted individuals subject to substantive due process as opposed to convicted 
individuals subject to the Eighth Amendment). 
 181 See Dale, supra note 125, at 729–30 (describing the DOJ’s authority to sue based on constitu-
tional and statutory causes of action for institutionalized persons). 
 182 Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997(a) (2012). 
 183 Id.; Bell, 441 U.S. at 535, 538 (establishing the substantive due process test); PATRICIA PU-
RITZ, MARY ANN SCALI, & AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., BEYOND THE 
WALLS: IMPROVING CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT FOR YOUTH IN CUSTODY 1 (1998) (creating a 
report to help juvenile justice professionals improve the conditions facing incarcerated youth). Never-
theless, because the DOJ sometimes has trouble with enforcement, public pressure is needed by law-
yers and advocacy groups to push for litigation regarding incarcerated LGBT youth. See Dale, supra 
note 125, at 730 (describing the DOJ’s lack of rigorous enforcement of CRIPA and the need for advo-
cates to build coalitions to enforce juveniles’ rights). 
 184 See Prison Rape Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601–15609 (2003) (developing standards to 
detect, prevent, reduce, and punish prison rape and increase accountability); Prison Rape Elimination 
Act National Standards, 28 C.F.R. § 115 (2012) (establishing a zero tolerance policy toward sexual 
abuse and creating safeguards to protect incarcerated individuals). 
 185 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Releases Final Rule to Prevent, 
Detect and Respond to Prison Rape (May 17, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-
releases-final-rule-prevent-detect-and-respond-prison-rape [https://perma.cc/9Y7X-BMBM] (setting 
national standards for juvenile facilities aimed at protecting inmates in all facilities from sexual abuse, 
including setting training and screening protocols to account for LGBT people generally). 
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with advocates pushing for policy changes, lawyers litigating conditions of 
confinement for incarcerated LGBT youth may be most effective to protect 
such youth.186 
CONCLUSION 
LGBT youth and especially transgender youth face harsh conditions from 
fellow inmates and staff while incarcerated in juvenile detention facilities. This 
is often due to their gender or sexuality expression and results in harassment 
and discrimination that may amount to a constitutional violation. Some circuits 
analyze conditions of confinement cases for juveniles through the lens of the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, while oth-
ers analyze such cases through the lens of the due process clause. There is no 
clear circuit split as to these cases because there is often confusion as to which 
test is actually being used and whether one is inclusive of the other. The Su-
preme Court has yet to make a decision on how courts should analyze condi-
tions of confinement for juveniles. In order to remedy the punitive conditions 
facing LGBT youth in juvenile facilities, the due process clause is the only 
constitutional remedy that can systemically reform the system, providing pro-
tection to a population that faces disproportionate discrimination and harass-
ment. There is an opportunity to utilize the protections offered by substantive 
due process, without placing an undue burden on plaintiffs to prove the requi-
site intent established by the Eighth Amendment. To alleviate some of the sys-
temic injustices facing LGBT youth in the juvenile justice system, the DOJ 
should be pressured by the public to litigate conditions of confinement claims 
on behalf of marginalized, incarcerated transgender youth. With more aware-
ness and notice of this issue, the Supreme Court may then apply its earlier ado-
lescent development reasoning to establish the substantive due process stand-
ard for such cases. This will ultimately provide for greater protection for all 
LGBT youth in the juvenile justice system. 
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186 See Dale, supra note 125, at 730–32 (arguing for the efficacy of increased litigation to correct 
unconstitutional conditions facing incarcerated youth); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra 
note 185 (describing the increased need to protected incarcerated LGBT youth). 
